

SUPPORT OF ATHENIAN INTELLECTUALS FOR PHILIP: A STUDY OF ISOCRATES' *PHILIPPUS* AND SPEUSIPPUS' *LETTER TO PHILIP*

IN the year 346 Isocrates wrote his discourse the *Philippus* (v) which he sent to Philip II of Macedon urging him to lead the Hellenic cities in an invasion of Persia.¹ This ninety-year-old teacher of rhetoric did not invent the so-called Panhellenic idea; it was first proposed by Gorgias in 392 and again celebrated by Lysias in 384. When Isocrates took up the notion in his *Panegyricus* (iv) of 380 and urged Athens and Sparta to assume joint leadership in a war against Persia, he repeatedly defends himself for speaking on a well-worn theme by the claim that he will do so in a superior fashion (iv 3-4, 7-10, 15). Ignored by the Athenians and Spartans, Isocrates seems to have felt that his proposal would find better reception among strong individual leaders, and he appealed probably to Jason of Pherae in the late 370s (see v 119; cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi 1.12; Isocr. *Ep.* vi 1), to Dionysius I of Syracuse in about 368 (*Ep.* i, esp. 7-8), and certainly to Archidamus of Sparta in about 356 (*Ep.* ix, esp. 17-9). The discourse to Philip, however, was surely of much greater political importance than Isocrates' previous appeals because it was addressed to an individual who was actually acquiring the strength to wage war against Persia. The Athenian rhetorician, inspired by the Peace of Philocrates, claims that he hopes to persuade both his fellow citizens and Philip that reconciliation of the Hellenic cities and an expedition against the Persians under the leadership of the Macedonian king would be to their mutual advantage (v 7-9). In this article, I shall argue, first, that certain opinions, proposals, and arguments contained in the *Philippus* show that the author was prevented by the requirements of good propaganda from making a fully candid and practical plan of action, but, instead, advocated a programme that would please the greatest possible number of Greeks. I shall also maintain that Isocrates by an appeal to myth was attempting to persuade the Athenians and other Greeks to be content with their present circumstances and to accept Philip as their legitimate leader in a campaign against Persia. In sum, I shall contend that all these passages were directed mainly towards Athenian public opinion, not towards Philip. Second, I shall argue that Isocrates is not *really* attempting to persuade Philip to undertake an expedition against the Persians, since he knows that the Macedonian king already has this ambition, but that by promoting this goal he hopes to win royal patronage for himself and his school. I will show that, to gain favour, the author indicated (in a veiled manner, since the work was also intended as propaganda) his approval of Philip's use of force against the Greeks, if this should be required to bring about the needed harmony among the Greek states. This interpretation of the *Philippus* will be confirmed by arguing that the implications and opinions of Isocrates' later writings related to Macedon demonstrate his approval of Philip's employment of compulsion against Hellenic cities. Third, I shall argue that as propaganda the *Philippus* enjoyed some success in 344, since it contributed both to the failure of Demosthenes' plans to secure Persian money for use against Macedon and to the temporary promotion of Philip's hopes for leadership of the Greeks in a war against Persia. Fourth, I will show that in 343, Speusippus and the Academy saw in the failure of Isocratean mythological warfare over Amphipolis an opportunity for themselves to move into a temporary theological vacuum with a more intense piece of flattery than even Isocrates could bring himself to write, in the hope that they could divert Philip's patronage their way, and that they succeeded, since Aristotle, a former member of the Academy, was appointed as tutor to Alexander. I will show that Speusippus' defence of Philip's claims to his territorial acquisi-

I wish to express my gratitude to Mr G. E. M. de Ste. Croix and Dr J. K. Davies for their painstaking criticism of earlier drafts of this article and Mr C. M. Reed for many helpful suggestions. They must not, however, be taken to agree with all the views which I have argued herein.

¹ For the precise date of the *Philippus*, see G. Mathieu, *Les Idées Politiques d'Isocrates* (Paris, 1925)

155-6. For a complete bibliography on the *Philippus* and related writings, see G. Dobesch, *Untersuchungen zum Korinthischen Bund* i, 'Der Panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v. Chr. und der 'Philippos' des Isokrates' (*Österr. Arch. Inst.*, 1968) 242-7; D. Gillis, *PP* xxiv (1969) 321-48, *Philologus* cxiv (1970) 195-210 and *WS* n.f. v (1971) 52-73; A. Fuks, *Ancient Society* iii (1972) 17-44.

tions in northern Greece was offered in opposition to the renewal of Athenian claims to Amphipolis, Potidaea, Torone and other states which was brought about by the response to the embassy of Python in 343; further, that his defence of Philip's admission into the Amphictyonic Council in place of the Phocians was open support for the Macedonian's interests in central and southern Greece and that his justification of Philip's claims to Ambracia was intended to encourage an attack on that city and alienate Corinth from Athens.² Fifth, I will also consider how seriously writers, recipient, and Greek public opinion took all this mythological contention, and, finally, what were the motives of intellectuals in their support of Philip.

I. THE *Philippus* AS PROPAGANDA

Isocrates' argument at the beginning of the *Philippus* that Philip should surrender Amphipolis to the Athenians must have been directed to Athenian opinion, not towards Philip. He wrote that Philip in attempting to retain Amphipolis was fighting for Athenian interests and Athens by struggling to take it away was contributing to the power of the Macedonian king (v 3). Not willing that his readers think that he was merely aiming to obtain a striking rhetorical paradox, he proceeds to develop his argument. He affirms that his audience commended, not the style of the speech, but rather its truth, that in no other way could the war be ended than by his proposal (4). He states that Philip must be persuaded that the friendship of Athens was worth more than the revenues of Amphipolis (5) and that he should realise that by formally surrendering the territory he would gain the good will of the Athenians yet would still hold it in his power, since his influence in the region was so great that Athenian settlers would actually serve as hostages (6). This argument has neither any structural relationship to the body of the composition nor any relevance in substance, as Isocrates himself realised, but is merely the fragment of a letter to Philip which he had been composing before the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates (v 1-2, 7). Moreover, by the terms of the treaty itself the Athenians relinquished all claims to Amphipolis, and, therefore, Isocrates' proposal that Philip should hand over this territory was otiose, if directed to the Macedonian king.³ Indeed, it is inconsistent with the claim which Isocrates makes when he takes up the main subject of the *Philippus*. He states (8): 'Although I was pleased with the decrees carried concerning the peace . . . I was disposed to consider immediately how the results which had been achieved might be made permanent for us . . .'. It would appear that Isocrates was neither content with the peace nor interested in its continuance, if his initial advice about Amphipolis was intended for Philip.⁴ All these difficulties disappear, however, if Isocrates attached his incomplete, earlier composition to the *Philippus* to make the Athenians well disposed towards its author and his major proposal that they should accept Philip as a leader in a panhellenic war against the barbarians. Isocrates was unpopular among his fellow Athenians (Isocr. xv 4-7; 153-4; *Ep.* ii 22; xii 5, 11) and had to gain their trust. The key to the hearts of the Athenians in 346 was to take the 'correct' stand on Amphipolis, and Isocrates' proposal was in perfect agreement with the instructions which they had given the First Embassy to Philip on the peace of 346, that the ambassadors were to defend the Athenian claim to Amphipolis; indeed, it was being written

² Since the definitive study of E. Bickermann and J. Sykutris in *Berichte über d. Verh. d. Sächs. Akad. d. Wissensch.* (Leipzig) lxxx 3 (1928) 1-86, *Epist. Socr.* xxx rightly has been accepted by all scholars as a genuine letter of Speusippus, nephew of Plato and second head of the Academy, to Philip II, king of Macedonia.

³ Ps.-Dem. vii 24-6; Dem. v 25; schol. on Ps.-Dem. vii 18, p. 81, 4; 23, p. 82, 22 and on Dem. xix 161, p. 391, 27 Df.

⁴ Dobesch (*op. cit.* [above n. 1] 61-6) does take the arguments seriously, but his astute observations

actually support my case that Isocrates intended his remarks on Amphipolis only as a bid for the goodwill of the Athenians. He finds in Isocrates' statements about Amphipolis (63) 'a passive indifference, even a certain defeatism' which 'must have had a favourable effect on Philip, since [they] strengthened in Athens the disinclination for further exertions of force and the mood of resignation'. S. Perlman (*Historia* vi [1957] 308-9) also considers Isocrates' proposals about Amphipolis as serious policy in indicating 'the way to an alliance with Athens'.

precisely at the time those instructions were being carried out. On this embassy, Aeschines' entire speech to Philip was a justification of Athenian claims to Amphipolis (Aesch. ii 25-33). It was made to satisfy the strong Athenian feelings on the issue which were reflected in the instructions given to the ambassadors, but it provided no basis for negotiations. As Grote pointed out, the losers could not seriously demand from the victor the city which was the original cause of the war (*Hist. Gr.* (London, 1888) ix, p. 373). Philip's subsequent good relations with Aeschines indicate that the Macedonian king recognised the reason for the speech and held no grudge against Aeschines for making it. Philip would surely have been clever enough to perceive that Isocrates was motivated by a similar purpose and would have found his pleasure in the major theme of the essay. Demosthenes at least as early as 352 knew the importance attached by Philip to Amphipolis, that he much preferred retaining that city to having peace with Athens (xxiii 111-3), and in 344 soon after the peace Demosthenes stated (vi 17) that it was only by Philip's retaining Amphipolis, Potidaea, and other cities claimed by the Athenians that he held safe possession of all his other territory. Isocrates was not such a fool that he was unable to perceive what was clear to Philip's bitter enemy. So the inclusion of the proposal on Amphipolis must have been directed to Athenian opinion, not towards Philip.

Next, the main proposal which Isocrates directs to Philip, that he should persuade the Greek cities to be reconciled and should win their good will towards an expedition against Persia led by him, is not practicable but good propaganda. Isocrates consistently attached great importance to creating good will in international affairs, and in both the *Philippus* and his first letter to Philip (*Ep.* ii) he urges the king to cultivate the good will and gain the respect of the Athenians and the other Hellenic cities by becoming their friend and benefactor.⁵ Isocrates was indeed a fool if he really expected Philip to rely on good will and persuasion and to abandon entirely the use of force against the Greek cities (v 16), and the Macedonian king was too much a realist to follow such advice. It is probably Isocrates, the skilled propagandist—no fool—who recommends the use of persuasion alone in Philip's dealing with the Greeks. As good propaganda, it is carefully disguised as a practical proposal.

Isocrates repeatedly stressed that the means which he suggested to Philip for uniting the Hellenic cities were practical.⁶ He explicitly distinguished his treatise from the useless speeches of the orators before the Athenian assembly and the ornamental panegyrics made at the public festivals; instead, his discourse, he insisted, was justified by the positive benefits which the Hellenic states would derive from its proposals being carried out (10, 12-3, 140, 144-8, 154). The method described by Isocrates, however, has no value as practical political advice; it is merely good propaganda. He writes (30): 'I affirm that, without neglecting any of your own interests, you ought to make an effort to reconcile Argos and Lacedaemon and Thebes and Athens; for if you can bring these cities together, you will not find it hard to unite the others as well; . . .'. Most important, Isocrates emphasises that this reconciliation is to be brought about by persuasion, not by force (31). He writes (16): '. . . as persuasion will be helpful in dealing with the Hellenes, so compulsion will be useful in dealing with the barbarians.' His principal argument that persuasion will succeed is that the major cities 'have been reduced to a level of equality by their misfortunes so that . . . they will prefer the mutual advantages of acting in unity to the selfish gains of their previous modes of conduct' (40). The claim that Athens, Argos, Thebes, and Sparta were all equal in power at this time is patently false. Sparta was indeed isolated, hated by the Peloponnesians, and plagued with internal problems, as Isocrates attests (v 49-50), but she was most threatened by the prospect of Philip's support of her enemies in Peloponnese.⁷ The weakness of Argos, as described by Isocrates (v 51-2), is confirmed by her support of Philip's admission to the Amphictyony in exchange for his assurances of help against the Spartans (Dem. v 14, 18; Isocr. v 74). Isocrates, however, argues that he is not obliged to speak of

⁵ v 6, 32-7, 68, 79-80, 86, 95, 116, 120-3, 127, 140; *Ep.* ii 18, 21. See J. de Romilly, 'Eunoia in Isocrates . . .' *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 92-101.

⁶ v 39-57, esp. 39-41, 57-67; see also 10, 12-3, 17, 24.

⁷ Philip's support for the Peloponnesian enemies of Sparta is denied by Isocrates (v 73-5), but confirmed as early as 347 by the failure of the decree of Eubulus; see Dem. xix 10-1, 303-6, 310; Aesch. ii 79, 164; M. Markle, *CQ* n.s. xxiv (1974) 253-68, on 257, n. 1.

Athens, since she had come 'to her senses before the others and made peace' (v 56). He, thus, avoids the completion of his argument which would have required him to show that Athens was as weak as Thebes, Argos, and Sparta. The Athenians were the most powerful of the Hellenic cities at this time with a fleet of three hundred triremes and an annual revenue of almost four hundred talents (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115, F 166; Dem. xix 89). In addition, Isocrates' low estimate of the power of Thebes (v 53-5) was immediately made obsolete by Philip's restoration of her control over the Boeotian cities (Dem. v 10, 21-2). Yet, even if for the sake of argument it is granted that these four cities were equally weak, it is naïve in the extreme to think that such a condition would encourage them to unite in accepting Philip as a leader. Furthermore, the examples which Isocrates cites to demonstrate his argument actually counter it; for they are cases of particular Hellenic cities changing sides in order either to preserve some semblance of a balance of power or to promote selfish interests at the expense of the rest (42-5). Hence, Isocrates' arguments that Philip should employ only persuasion in his dealings with the Greeks provided the king with no viable policy but were directed to the Greeks as effective propaganda.

If Isocrates recommended the idea that Philip persuade the Hellenic cities to be reconciled with each other and follow him as practical advice and not as propaganda, then it ought to be dismissed as nothing more than the vain illusion of a senile pedant. It would hardly be worth discussing had it not been taken seriously by notable historians of this century.⁸ Philip, of course, would have been a fool to follow such a proposal; he could not risk an invasion of Asia Minor without taking steps to ensure that the Hellenic states did not combine in an attack on Macedon in his absence. In fact, Philip's policy was, and remained, the opposite of that proposed by Isocrates. Instead of attempting to unify and reconcile the Hellenic cities, he took advantage of their divisions to play one against the other.⁹ Philip's support of the enemies of Sparta in the Peloponnese can be detected as early as the spring of 347. The failure of Aeschines' embassy to Megalopolis indicates the support for the Macedonian king there and among the Arcadian cities who still adhered to the Megalopolitans, and the failure of the decree of Eubulus demonstrates a similar feeling in Argos and Messenia.¹⁰ By the spring of 346 Philip had almost completely isolated Sparta; her sole powerful ally, the Athenians, had accepted an alliance with Philip in April, and by June the Messenians, Argives and Megalopolitans were sufficiently tied to Philip to cause some of the orators in Athens to claim that he intended to join them in destroying the Lacedaemonians and to bring the Peloponnese under his rule.¹¹ Moreover, from Aeschines' account of Philip's negotiations with the embassies from various Hellenic states at Pella in June 346, at

⁸ Eduard Meyer, 'Isokrates' zweiter Brief an Philipp und Demosthenes' 2. Philippika,' *Sitzber. d. königl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, phil.-hist. Kl. xxxi (1909) 758-79, who writes 'As Isocrates above all distinguishes himself whenever he speaks of current political questions by his clear perception and understanding judgment . . .' (763). Meyer sees the embassy of Python and its offers to the Athenians that they might propose an amendment to the peace as motivated by Isocrates' letter to Philip of 344. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii² 1, 522-5, conceives of Isocrates as strongly influencing Philip and Greek public opinion. For a summary of these and other views favourable towards Isocrates early in this century, see C. Adams, *CP* vii (1912) 343-50. More recent favourable views are those of: Eino Mikkola, *Ann. Acad. Sci. Fenn.*, ser. B. lxxxix (1955), esp. 235-43. The picture which he draws of the Persian threat is taken completely from Isocrates without the investigation of any independent sources! S. Perlman, *op. cit.* (above n. 4) esp. 311-2, who argues that in the *Philippus* Isocrates envisaged Athens as sharing in Philip's war against Persia as a naval partner, is rightly refuted by K. Bringmann, *Hypomnemata* xiv

(1965) 99. But both Bringman (96-102) and Perlman (306-17) agree in interpreting the *Philippus* as a serious, straightforward political proposal. Finally, there is the thorough work of Dobesch, *op. cit.* (above n. 1) esp. 52-3, 69-71, 117-23, 124-6, 182-4, 187. On 117-23, Dobesch actually examines the question which I consider in this article whether it would be realistic for Philip to follow Isocrates' advice to trust to persuasion in dealing with the Greeks, but he hedges in his answer by trying to have it both ways. He stresses that Isocrates' proposal is practical but when he recommends the use of persuasion to Philip he is proposing an ideal which in fact cannot be achieved.

⁹ P. Cloché, *Isocrate et son Temps* (Paris, 1963) 117-27, shows most forcefully how Philip ignored Isocrates' advice after the publication of the *Philippus*, and how the Macedonian king's contrary behaviour was allowed to pass without comment in the rhetorician's letter of 344 (*Ep.* ii).

¹⁰ See above n. 7.

¹¹ Isocr. v 74-5; see also Dem. v 18; vi 9, 13-15, 19-27; xviii 18-19, 64, 295; xix 10-11, 260-2, 303-6, 310; Paus. iv 28. 2; v 20. 9-10; vii 30. 6.

the very time Isocrates was completing his *Philippus*, it is clear that the Macedonian king was attempting to provoke the Athenians against the Thebans (ii 103–7). In fact, the principal and immediate reason for Philip's insistence on alliance with Athens was to draw the city into joining him in liberating the Boeotian towns. Demosthenes, knowing that such a move would ruin a potential ally for Athens against Philip, succeeded in frustrating this aim.¹² Isocrates must have observed that Philip was pursuing a 'divide and rule' policy towards the Greeks and stressed that the king should persuade them to be reconciled so that his discourse would gain praise and acceptance. To write openly in 346 that Philip should use force to do down the factions opposed to him in the various Greek cities not only would have been unsafe, even in the tolerant climate of the Athenian democracy, but also would have been ineffective propaganda.

Again, in order to make his proposal more acceptable to the Greek states, Isocrates is deliberately vague about the position which he advocates for Philip as their leader. He writes (69–70): 'Men of the highest renown will come as ambassadors from the greatest states to your court; you will consult with them about the general welfare, for which no other man will be found to have shown a like concern; you will see all Hellas on tiptoe with interest in whatever you happen to propose; and no one will be indifferent to the measures which are being decided in your councils . . .' and (127): 'It is your duty, . . . just as one who is free and unattached (*ἄφειτον*) to consider all Hellas as your fatherland'. There is no mention of treaties of alliance, assignment of command on land and/or sea, the role of the Hellenic states in the making of decisions, the institution of a council or assembly of his Hellenic allies. He describes Philip as 'being in charge of' (*ἐπιστατοῦντος*) the reconciliation of the Greek cities (45), the peace (50), and as a leader (*ἐπιστάτης*) in such great affairs (71), but he carefully avoids the use of the term *ἡγεμων* to describe the position intended for Philip. He comes closest in section 97 when he is comparing Philip with Clearchus and describes the Macedonian king as 'going to lead' (*ἡγησόμενον*) the expedition. It must be stressed that Isocrates does not avoid the use of the term *ἡγεμονία* in the *Panegyricus* when it is a matter of arguing Athens' right to share it with Sparta (iv 17–8, 20–2, 25, 99, 166). Isocrates does not specifically propose a hegemony of Philip over the Greek cities, for to have done so would have given offence to many Greeks and would have made his propaganda less effective.

In a similar manner, Isocrates attempts to make his proposal popular among the Greeks by arguing that they will derive numerous benefits from an expedition against the Great King in return for their *good will*, rightly assessed by Baynes as 'not a costly commodity'.¹³ Philip, Isocrates writes, will be able to find sufficient soldiers for the war more easily 'from among those who wander in exile than from those who live under their own polities' (95–6); he should 'employ these bands in a war against the barbarians' (120–3). Of course, Isocrates was aware that the Greeks could not expect to share in the wealth of the Persians unless they participated in the fighting. He does not exclude from the expedition soldiers sent out from their states in sections 95–6 but merely stresses that Philip will recruit them more easily among unemployed wanderers. That he saw the Greek cities involved in the fighting is also indicated in another statement (9): '. . . I found that by no other means could Athens maintain the peace, unless the greatest Greek cities should . . . carry the war beyond their borders into Asia'. This action obviously could not be taken by passive good will but only by active participation. Skilful propaganda stresses that all will benefit from the efforts of only a few.

Finally, Isocrates employs the myth of Heracles to persuade the Athenians and other Greeks to be content with their present circumstances and to accept Philip as their legitimate leader in a campaign against Persia. Heracles was selected for several reasons. The Argead ruling house of Macedon had long claimed to be his descendants (Hdt. viii 137; Thuc. ii 99); he had been both the recipient of many benefits from the Greek cities and frequently their benefactor, and he had made war on Troy, an antecedent of Persia as the

¹² See Markle, *op. cit.* (above n. 7) 253–68.

¹³ N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London, 1955) 144–67, on 156.

barbaric, eastern enemy in Hellenic opinion. Isocrates meant to lay to rest the fears being aroused among the Athenians by such leaders as Hegesippus and Aristophon who opposed the Peace of Philocrates and kept insisting that Philip's power was being built up to the detriment of Hellas and that the king was plotting against the Greeks (73-4).¹⁴ Isocrates does not explicitly respond to this group; instead, he directs his argument against the avowed partisans of Philip, who, he says, are convinced by the accusations of the anti-Macedonians but who think that the purpose with which Philip is charged is a worthy ambition (75). 'These (pro-Macedonians),' Isocrates writes, 'are so senseless that they do not realise that with the same characterisation they may injure some persons and help others. For example, if . . . one were to say that the King of Asia was plotting against the Hellenes . . . he would not be saying anything disparaging of him But if . . . one should bring this charge against one of the descendants of Heracles, who made himself the benefactor of all Hellas, he would bring upon him the greatest opprobrium' (76). Isocrates goes on to say that if a descendant of Heracles should prove to be plotting against the Greeks he would incur much hatred (77), and he admonishes Philip to reflect on this matter, because of the false rumours spread by his enemies (78). The argument is very subtle and elusive. Isocrates dismisses the over-zealous Athenian patriots as trouble-makers and war-mongers, and he concentrates on the avowed partisans of Philip by charging them on the basis of the Heracles myth with injuring the one whom they support. He also employs the myth to warn Philip not to act contrary to the example of his ancestor. This is effective propaganda. Extremists are assailed, and Philip is warned. But, above all, fears are lulled, because one is left with the distinct impression that a descendant of Heracles, the greatest benefactor of Hellas, would not be likely to be plotting against the Hellenic states.

Isocrates also employs the Heracles myth to persuade the Greeks to accept Philip as their legitimate leader in a campaign against Persia. He writes as if he is trying to convince Philip to benefit the Hellenes by assuming leadership in a war against the barbarians, and he argues that Philip owes this service to the Greeks because the major Greek cities were benefactors of his ancestor Heracles. He, Isocrates records, was in debt to Argos as the land of his forefathers, the Thebans because they honoured Heracles more than the other gods, the Spartans since they had made the Heracleidae their kings, and to the Athenians for aiding Heracles to gain immortality and for preserving his children from destruction at the hands of Eurystheus (32-6). Though superficially the argument is directed to Philip, it is really intended to persuade the Greeks to accept Philip as leader by the strong implication that they, not Philip, would be the beneficiaries of such leadership.

Isocrates shapes his account of the exploits of Heracles in order to provide an exact precedent for his main proposal. He writes (111-2): 'When Heracles saw that Hellas was filled with wars and factions . . . he reconciled the cities with each other, and then showed to succeeding generations with whom and against whom they ought to go to war. For he made an expedition against Troy . . . and . . . easily took the city by storm.' He then urges Philip to follow the example of his ancestor Heracles and 'make expeditions . . . with the Hellenes against those upon whom it is fitting that the descendants of Heracles should wage war' (113-5). Again, though Isocrates writes as if recommending his proposal to Philip, he intends to persuade the Hellenes that the Macedonian king has an hereditary right to lead them in a war on Persia. He also stresses that Philip, like Heracles, stands above all the Hellenic cities with their petty mutual strife and that they can legitimately obey him, though once more he merely implies that they should take this attitude by recommending it to Philip. He states (127): 'It is fitting . . . that you . . . consider all Hellas as your fatherland, as did the founder of your race. . . .' In conclusion, since the ostensible recipient of the discourse is Philip, Isocrates is required to address him consistently throughout, but many of the proposals and arguments in the *Philippus* appear much more intelligent if they are regarded as directed to the Athenians and other Greeks as propaganda. Indeed, it could not be otherwise in a letter written for publication to advocate a proposal which could be carried out only by general support.

¹⁴ For Hegesippus' opposition to the peace and Aristophon's, Theopompus, *FGrH* 115, F 166; cf. alliance, see schol. on Dem. xix 72, p. 364, 1; for Dem. xix 89.

II. THE *Philippus* AS A BID FOR ROYAL PATRONAGE

Isocrates directed the discourse not only to the Athenians and other Greeks as propaganda but also to Philip in hope of winning favour for himself and his school. When he read the completed composition to some of his associates, they predicted that both Philip and the Greeks would be grateful for what Isocrates had said (v 23; see also 82). I will now consider how Isocrates expected to please Philip and to convince him that he was worthy of royal patronage. One illusion must be dispelled in the beginning. Isocrates did not expect to win favour by persuading Philip to reconcile the Greek states and to lead an expedition against Persia. The Athenian rhetorician, not known for his modesty (see e.g. Isocr. xv 8, 13), himself writes later that he supposed that Philip had already decided on the expedition against the barbarians and the *Philippus* had been written to support this ambition (*Ep.* iii 3). It was, therefore, by promoting this goal that Isocrates hoped to win royal patronage for himself and his school.

First, Isocrates' emphasis on the use of persuasion as a method of dealing with the Greeks would have pleased Philip both because it was effective propaganda and because he himself preferred to employ diplomacy whenever possible in his foreign relations. His abilities in negotiations on the peace were attested by the First Embassy to the Athenian Assembly in 346 and consequently must have been much discussed during the time Isocrates was composing the *Philippus* (Aesch. ii 43, 52). Historians were later to single out Philip's diplomatic skill as a principal reason for his success. The source of Diodorus, after his account of the assassination of Philip, sums up the king's accomplishments (xvi 95.2-4). He writes that 'the growth of his position was not due so much to his prowess in arms as to his adroitness and cordiality in diplomacy. Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic successes than of his valour in actual battle. Every member of his army shared in the successes which were won in the field but he alone got credit for victories won through negotiation' (so also Polyæn. iv 2.9). One example of Philip's use of diplomacy, stressed by Polybius (v 10.1-5), was his generous treatment of the Athenians after Chaeronea, by which he is said to have won them over to the support of his schemes. Gentleness and moderation were not, however, the only tools of Philip's diplomacy; bribery and deception were equally effective.

Second, Isocrates understood that, if he was to win the favour of Philip by his pamphlet, he must not be taken for a dreamy intellectual who, though unaware of the means for carrying out his proposal, presumed to advise the world's most successful military leader. Furthermore, he wants Philip to know that he is fully conscious of this risk, and, therefore, in his introduction he includes a long account of how his associates attempted to discourage him from sending the king an address whose aim was to urge on him a practicable undertaking (17-24). His companions asked him, 'Do you not think that the man who has such achievements will condemn the sender of this book as a big fool and will think that he was much deceived about the power of his words and his own insight' (21)? I have already shown that for the purpose of propaganda Isocrates had to stress that Philip should employ only persuasion to reconcile the Greek states and that by his benefactions should gain their good will towards his leadership in a war on Persia. Isocrates, however, was aware that persuasion and good deeds alone were not sufficient means by which Philip could carry out the proposal. He knew that if Philip was to invade Asia Minor he must get control of the Greek cities by force. If Isocrates was not to be discounted as a fool, he had to indicate to Philip that he understood the need of compulsion for carrying out his proposal and that he approved of its use. At the same time, he must hint at this insight and approval so covertly as not to harm the discourse as good propaganda.

First, though Isocrates urges Philip to cultivate the good will of the Athenians and other Greeks (see above, p. 82), he speaks in a different context of 'good will' as compelled; he writes (v 6) that if the Athenians got possession of Amphipolis 'we should be compelled to maintain the same good will towards your policy, because of our settlers there' whom Philip could hold as hostages. This curious ambivalence in the term 'good will' perhaps exists as an undercurrent to the advice of Isocrates throughout the *Philippus*, and thereby he is hinting

to Philip that it may be necessary to extort the good will of those states which refuse to support him. This possibility becomes probable when one considers what Isocrates says in the discourse about the advantages of monarchic power.

In the *Philippus* the author unmistakably implies that it is by means of Philip's power that he will be able to compel the Greek cities to be reconciled. In his discussion of the advantages enjoyed by Philip in being a monarch, he points out that Philip possesses more power than any of the Greeks (14-6). Other men live subject to such inconveniences as constitutions and laws 'with power to do nothing except what is prescribed' while Philip alone has 'much licence'; he is 'possessed of both wealth and power beyond any of the Hellenes, which are the only things in the world that are adapted at once to persuade and compel . . . and as persuasion will be useful in dealing with the Hellenes, so compulsion will be useful in dealing with the barbarians'. Isocrates, who thoroughly understood the advantages of monarchic rule (see e.g. iii 'Nicocles' 17-26, esp. 22), would have been the last to forget that if persuasion backed by money did not avail, then force exerted by power could be employed. Philip had not demonstrated before that he made any such distinctions between Greeks and barbarians. Indeed, Isocrates celebrates the fact that a king had no need to employ persuasion. The same implication is found again in the *Philippus*; Isocrates writes (41): 'Furthermore, while I grant that no one else in the world could reconcile these cities, yet nothing of the sort is difficult for you. . . .' He then refers generally to the many 'hopeless and unthinkable' undertakings which Philip 'carried through to a successful end'. These achievements would, of course, have included his victories, especially those at the beginning of his reign when he was beset by many enemies at once, some of whom were individually superior to him in numbers. Isocrates concludes from these successes that 'it would be nothing strange if you should be able alone to effect this union (of the Greek states)'. The author in this same passage finally states explicitly that it is Philip's power which qualifies him to reconcile the Greek cities: 'In fact, men of excellence and high purposes ought . . . to undertake enterprises . . . which no one would attempt except men with . . . power such as you possess' (see also 127). Isocrates, therefore, stresses that Philip had the means to reconcile the Greek cities both because he had more power than any of them and his use of this power was subject only to his own will. Demosthenes later gives precisely the same account of Philip's advantages, but his assessment is given not to explain, as Isocrates, how the Macedonian could benefit the Greeks but why he had been so formidable an enemy. He writes (xviii 235): 'In the first place, he was the despotic commander of his adherents: and in war that is the most important of all advantages. . . . Then he was well provided with money: he did whatever he chose, without giving notice by publishing decrees, or deliberating in public, without fear of prosecution by informers or indictment for illegal measures. He was responsible to nobody: he was the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything' (cf. Dem xix 184-5). Both Demosthenes and Isocrates understood the advantages in both war and diplomacy enjoyed by Philip as an autocrat, but Isocrates stresses much more the power possessed by the Macedonian king and how it could be used to bend others to his will. A correct understanding of Isocrates' message to Philip depends on not being misled by the language of political propaganda. When, for example, Isocrates urges Philip 'to persuade the Greek states to be reconciled', he seems to be advocating that the king do them a favour. But what does reconciliation mean in practice when it is to be brought about by force with the end in view that the reconciled states should accept the leadership of Philip in a war on Persia? Reconciliation actually means control, and Isocrates' advice, stripped of euphemism, is that Philip should employ force to get control of the Greek states so that, at best, they would support the war, or, at least, not oppose it.

This interpretation of the *Philippus*, that its author hints at both his understanding of the need for force and his approval of its use by Philip in 'reconciling' the Greek states, is corroborated by the implications and opinions of Isocrates' later writings related to Macedon. His support for Philip continued in his letters, in spite of the fact that the Macedonian did not follow his advice to use persuasion in dealing with the Greeks but persisted in forcing them to obey him. I shall argue that Isocrates in his letter of 344 (*Ep.* ii) implied that Philip should

use force to get control of Athens, and I will point out that in his letter to Philip in 338 (*Ep.* iii) he openly rejoiced because the king no longer needed to persuade the Greeks after his victory at Chaeronea but could compel them to support his plans.

To understand the implications of Isocrates' letter of 344, it must be considered in its historical context.¹⁵ After the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates in 346, Philip was at first distracted from attending to his interests in Greece by trouble from the Illyrians and Triballians on his northern frontiers.¹⁶ But as soon as he had defeated these peoples, he marched into Thessaly against the cities which still opposed his control in that country. Most notably, the Pheraeans had been divided in their support of Philip's settlement of the Sacred War in 346 and at first had refused to follow him to Thermopylae (*Dem.* xix 320); thus, at his earliest opportunity, in 344, he attacked and defeated them and placed a garrison in their citadel.¹⁷ During the same year, Halus, a Thessalian ally of Athens, fell, after a long siege conducted by Parmenio, and Philip handed its territory over to the Pharsalians, his allies.¹⁸ Under the leadership of the Aleuad Simus, Larisa turned against Philip, but this city too was soon restored to his control by the expulsion of the rebellious faction.¹⁹ To consolidate his hold over the disobedient cities Philip seems to have established a dekarchy in Thessaly, though how this oligarchy functioned is not explained by Demosthenes, who alone attests its existence (vi 22).²⁰

Immediately after Philip's successful campaign against Thessaly in 344, Isocrates wrote him a letter which, in addition to renewing the proposal of the *Philippus* (*Ep.* ii 11) and expressing concern for his personal safety (2-4) because of his being wounded in the Illyrian campaign (11-2), praised his treatment of the Thessalians (20). Isocrates' approval of Philip's Thessalian policy was in agreement with a position formerly stated in the *Philippus*. There he had represented an associate as commending the Macedonian's relations with the Thessalians (v 20): 'Has he (Philip) not converted the Thessalians . . . into an attitude . . . friendly to him. . . . And as to the cities which are in that region, has he not drawn some of them by his benefactions into an alliance with him; and others, which caused him great distress, has he not utterly overthrown?' This method was indeed effective in making a territory friendly towards oneself by rewarding one's supporters and destroying one's adversaries; it was the policy which Philip had followed in Thessaly before 346 and successfully pursued again in his invasion of 344. Isocrates' commendation of this course of action in his letter of 344, therefore, illuminates clearly his own attitude towards *Realpolitik*. He writes (*Ep.* ii 20): 'Consider also that to many you appear to have been well advised because your treatment of the Thessalians has been just and advantageous to them, although they are a people not easy to handle, but high-spirited and filled with factional strife.' To Isocrates 'just and advantageous' treatment of other states seems to consist of ensuring that one's friends are in control of them either by internal subversion or external attack. He then proceeds to urge Philip to treat the Athenians just as he has the Thessalians: 'You should, therefore, attempt to deal with us in the same way (*χρή τοίνυν και περι ήμῶς περιρᾶσθαι γινεσθαι σε τοιοῦτον . . .*) in the knowledge that, though the territory of the Thessalians borders on yours, we happen to be next to you in our power, which by every means you should seek to gain for yourself.' In other words, Philip should attempt to gain the support of Athens by promoting by all means his friends in the city and by crushing all factions which were opposing him. To disguise the ruthlessness of this advice, Isocrates adds (21): 'For it is a much greater glory to capture the good will of cities than their walls . . .'. It has already been shown that Isocrates can also speak of good will as extorted by force.

¹⁵ The date of *Ep.* ii was definitely established as 344 by the discovery of the papyrus containing the fragment of Didymus' *Commentary on Demosthenes' Orations*; see Meyer, *op. cit.* (above n. 8) 758 ff. and Mathieu, *op. cit.* (above n. 1) 164-5.

¹⁶ Diod. xvi 69. 7; *cf.* 93. 6; Trogus, *prol.* 8; *Dem.* xviii 42-4, 67; *Isocr. Ep.* ii 2, 11-2; Didym. *In Demosth.* col. xii 63-6; Theopompus *FGrH* 115, F 182; *Just.* viii 6. 3-4.

¹⁷ *Ps.-Dem.* vii 32; *Dem.* viii 59; ix 12; xix 260;

Diod. xvi 69.8.

¹⁸ *Dem.* xix 36 with schol. p. 352, 17; 39, 159, 163, 174, 334; Strabo ix 5.8.

¹⁹ H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London, 1935) 190-2.

²⁰ M. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno* (Rome, 1958) 275-93, esp. 275-81, inclines to the view that the text of Demosthenes was corrupted in antiquity by the substitution of *δεκαρχία* for *τετραρχία*. *Cf.* Westlake, *op. cit.* (above n. 19) 196-9.

In Isocrates' last letter to Philip (*Ep.* iii), he no longer covertly urged his compelling the Greeks to accept his leadership against Persia but openly approved of this policy.²¹ Writing after the Macedonian victory at Chaeronea in 338, not long before his death, he reminded Philip of the earlier discourse in which he had advised the Macedonian king to reconcile Athens with the other major Greek cities and thus to bring all the other Greeks into concord. ' . . . now', Isocrates writes, 'it has come to pass that the need for persuasion no longer exists; for on account of the battle which has taken place, all are compelled . . . to desire that which they surmise you wish to do . . . and carry the war into Asia' (*Ep.* iii 2). The content of this letter also confirms my interpretation of the *Philippus* that in 346 Isocrates was advocating to Philip the employment of persuasion backed up by force to unify the Greek states in accepting his leadership in a Persian war and that the Athenian rhetorician made this proposal as a bid for royal patronage for himself and his school.

III. THE SUCCESS OF THE PRO-PHILIP, ANTI-PERSIAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS

The tale of negotiations between Athens and Persia and between the former and Philip in the period 346–339 shows the success of a pro-Philip, anti-Persian policy in Athens, which eventually led to the defeat of an important part of Demosthenes' plans against Macedon. That Isocrates' propaganda in the *Philippus* and his letter to Philip of 344 contributed to hardening Athenian attitudes against Persia and promoting favour towards Philip cannot be proved but seems highly probable for several reasons. Isocrates' complaints about his unpopularity among the Athenians prove that his writings, or at least opinions, were known to large numbers of his fellow citizens and not limited merely to students in his school and friends to whom he read his compositions.²² On the other hand, the fact that Isocrates was personally unpopular with the masses because of his reluctance to perform public services and his anti-democratic views does not mean that none of his writings would be influential. The *Philippus* was directed to a leader who actually had the power to wage war on Persia, and many Athenians would have been attracted by the plea to sink factional differences, accept Philip as leader, and win for themselves the riches of the Great King. Such an appeal was deliberately framed for the undiscerning dreamers who form a considerable part of any population. Moreover, the *Philippus* and the *Second Letter* provide the sole extant programmatic statement most closely resembling the policy which Androtion carried through the Assembly in 344, and this politician was a former pupil of Isocrates. Though the assumption that other propaganda supported an anti-Persian, pro-Philip policy at this time is not in itself improbable, there is not the slightest evidence for it. Moreover, when Demosthenes complains of anti-Persian attitudes, he cites as indicative of these prejudices catch-words and phrases which are characteristic of Isocrates' writings (x 33). Again, when Hegesippus refers to Python of Byzantium, another pupil of Isocrates, who represented the interests of Philip on an embassy in 343, he describes him as instructed by his former teachers in Athens in what to say to the Assembly (*Ps.-Dem.* vii 23). These circumstances suggest that Isocrates' views had some influence on the Assembly both directly through being well advertised and indirectly through his former pupils.

Dislike of the Persians by the Athenians, which had been most recently encouraged by Isocrates, was an obstacle to the efforts of Demosthenes in 341 to strengthen the city for the approaching struggle with Philip. When in the *Fourth Philippic* he stresses the need of money for military purposes (x 31) he complains that the Athenians ought to have concluded an alliance with the Persian king long ago (34).²³ He indicates the reason why such an

²¹ The authenticity of *Ep.* iii was first questioned by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Aristoteles und Athen* [Berlin, 1893] ii, 395–7; *Hermes* xxxiii [1899] 494–5) on insufficient grounds. The argument in favour of its authenticity by Mathieu (*op. cit.* [above n. 1] 172–3) is decisive.

²² *Isocr.* xv 4–7, 153–4; *Ep.* ii 22; xii 5, 11.

²³ *Dem.* x *The Fourth Philippic*, the authenticity of which has been questioned, has been generally accepted as genuine since the discovery of Didymus' *Commentary on Demosthenes*; see A. Körte, *RhM* lx (1905) 388–416; C. D. Adams *CPh* xxxiii (1938) 129–44; S. G. Daitz, *CPh* lii (1957) 145–62.

alliance has not been made (33): 'I think . . . you ought to drop the foolish prejudice that has so often brought about your disadvantage—'the barbarian', 'the common enemy of us all', and all such phrases.' The anti-Persian bias was deeply rooted in Athenian feelings, and Demosthenes himself had admitted that he held such opinions when it suited his purpose (xiv 3, 6, 31, 35-7). In 354, he had adopted the point of view of his audience to persuade them that, although their hatred and suspicion of the Persians was justified, waging war against them under the existing circumstances was foolish. In 341, when Persian money was needed against Philip, it was necessary to persuade the Athenians to abandon their prejudices which had been fostered by the anti-Persian propaganda of Gorgias, Lysias and Isocrates for almost sixty years. After urging the Athenians to rid themselves of their hostile feelings about the Persians, Demosthenes (x 34) refers to the Athenian rejection in 344 of the Persian king's offer of an alliance: 'he (Artaxerxes) . . . was even now making overtures to us, and if you did not accept them but voted their rejection, the fault is not his. . . .' Androtion, the Athenian who led the opposition to the Persian request in the crucial assembly, had once been a pupil of Isocrates (*FGrH* 324 T 1, 2b, 2c). Being the son of the moderate oligarch Andron, he would by family tradition have been receptive to the conservative views of his teacher. Isocrates himself never appeared before the assembly because of the weakness of his voice (xv 144-5; xii 9-11), and he doubtless was pleased that his former pupil assumed leadership in the assembly in promoting a policy similar to that which he had set forth in the *Philippus*. Androtion was a prominent orator and writer who had been active in Athenian politics for more than forty years and, of course, was not acting as a spokesman for Isocrates but was advocating a policy which he himself had worked out and in which he firmly believed. He could, however, not have been unaware of its close correspondence with the political views of his former teacher.²⁴ Since the Athenian refusal of help to Persia had such a disastrous effect on Demosthenes' policy, the situation must be considered in some detail.

In 346, Isocrates in his discourse to Philip described Artaxerxes as 'an object of laughter and scorn'. He had been defeated in a major attempt to subdue Egypt, and, in addition, Cyprus, Cilicia and Phoenicia were in revolt (v 101-2). Two years later in 344, still unable to settle the rebellion, Artaxerxes Ochus sent envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting that they support the Persians in their campaign against the Egyptians. The Thebans and Argives sent a total of four thousand hoplites and two generals, but the Athenians and Lacedaemonians refused any aid (Diod. xvi 44). The Persian embassy presented its case before the Athenians at an assembly in September 344.²⁵ Ambassadors from Philip were also present, and, although they had come in order to negotiate some point of disagreement which had arisen under the prevailing peace of Philocrates, they would have been extremely eager to persuade the Athenians not to give any help to the Persians (*FGrH* 324, F 53). Androtion, leading the opposition in the assembly and even making the prevailing motion, brought it about that the Athenians treated the Persian ambassadors in a contemptuous manner.²⁶ The response which was brought back to the king was only that the Athenians would remain at peace with Artaxerxes if he did not proceed against the Hellenic cities.

Was there any cause of annoyance to the Persian king in addition to the rude treatment of his ambassadors and the unsatisfactory Athenian response to his request for aid? Androtion who, of course, was present on the occasion wrote in his *Atthis* that ambassadors from Philip were present concerning the peace. Four years later, in 340, Philip is represented, perhaps by Anaximenes of Lampsacus, as writing in a letter to the Athenians (Ps.-Dem. xii 6): ' . . . before the King reduced Egypt and Phoenicia, you passed a decree calling on me to make

²⁴ Jacoby (*FGrH* IIIb [suppl.] i 88-93) argues that Androtion 'was not pro-Macedonian, he was anti-Persian', but his view is unacceptable. No *practical* politician would have advocated that Athens lead a war against Persia in 344 when she had lost not only the Social War of the 350s but also the war against Philip in 346, and Androtion was no retiring intellectual but an active politician. The only possible leader for such a war was Philip.

²⁵ For the date of the Persian embassy, see Jacoby,

FGrH IIIb (suppl.) i 532, which I accept in spite of the doubts of P. A. Brunt, *CQ* n.s. xix (1969) 345-65 on 256.

²⁶ The opinion that Androtion moved the response to Persia depends on Diels' supplement of Didymus, col. 8, line 15, which has been almost universally accepted; for the suggestion of a different restoration, see G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s. xiii (1963) 121-38 on 131, n. 1.

common cause with the rest of the Greeks against him, in case he attempted to interfere with us; . . .’ Although this document may not be a copy of the original letter from Philip, it has been generally accepted by historians as representing the substance of Philip’s protest in 340.²⁷ Other contemporary sources confirm that most of the incidents, to which Philip makes reference, occurred, though, of course, an interpretation is given of them to support his case. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt the truth of Philip’s claim about the Athenian decree of 344. He would not be portrayed by so skilful an historian as the author of this letter as writing to the Athenians a few years later that they had passed a decree which they had not passed. Such a claim could be too easily refuted by his enemies if it was not true and would be a weakness in an otherwise exceedingly strong brief. Moreover, the account of the decree given by Philip fits perfectly the occasion described by Androtion, especially in regard to the response given to the Persian envoys that peace would be maintained with Artaxerxes *unless* he proceeded against the Hellenic cities. The appropriate corollary to this response would have been to carry a decree for the ambassadors from Philip calling on the Greeks to join with the Macedonian king in a war against Persia if Artaxerxes should first attack the Greek cities. It is a probable conjecture that Androtion also led the assembly in the adoption of this decree which would have been highly offensive to the Persian king. Philocrates also may have supported this policy, since he chose to flee the city rather than stand trial in the summer, 343, at the same time that Androtion was exiled. Isocrates’ *Philippus* and his open letter to Philip in 344 had probably aroused hopes among the Athenians that Philip, if he were given the opportunity, could lead them to win the riches of the East. This mood of the assembly enabled Androtion to secure the adoption of his proposals, but his policy came to naught, because Philip was soon to alienate utterly Athenian public opinion by interference in the internal affairs of states whose friendliness was vital to the security of Athens. The Athenian assembly was not to be so deceived again.

In 341, Demosthenes again tried to persuade the Athenians to establish good relations with the Persian king (ix 71; x 31–4). He argued that the city needed money for the coming struggle against Philip and that Artaxerxes Ochus would be inclined to grant an alliance, since Philip in his conquest of eastern Thrace was at war with ‘men whom the king of Persia trusts and has accepted as his “benefactors”’ (Dem. x 31; cf. Hdt. viii 85). He also pointed out that Ochus would have learned the whole of Philip’s designs against Persia from the captured Hermias of Atarneus and that he thus would know that he and Athens shared the enmity of Philip. Demosthenes urged that the ambassadors should point out to the Persian king how much more dangerous Philip would be to Persia if he subdued Athens first. Demosthenes’ advice was taken. However, the Athenian ambassadors found their task difficult, and negotiations were still being carried on when Philip sent a letter to the Athenians a year later in the summer of 340. The Macedonian king complains that the Athenian embassy at the Persian court is urging the king to make war on him and is negotiating for a defensive alliance (Ps.-Dem. xii 6–7) Isocrates (xii 159–60) expresses his opposition to these negotiations, yet earlier in the discourse makes the false claim that Athens never in previous wars sought help from Persia, obviously with hope that she would not do so then (102.) The Persian king still remembered the rude response given his ambassadors in Athens a few years before, and he ultimately decided to oppose Philip but to give no assistance to Athens. The satraps of Asia Minor sent a force of mercenaries and forced Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus,²⁸ and, though Demosthenes may have seen in this act a reason for hope that Ochus would become the paymaster of the Hellenic cities in their war against Philip, he was soon to be disillusioned. The response brought back by Ephialtes and his colleagues was both insolent and abrupt: ‘I will not give you gold; stop asking me for it; you will not get it’ (Aesch. iii 238). Plutarch reports (*Mor.* 847f, 848e) that Ephialtes

²⁷ For a detailed treatment of Ps.-Dem. xii, see L. Bliquez, *A Commentary on Pieces XI and XII of the Demosthenic Corpus* (Stanford University Ph.D. dissertation, 1968). Bliquez argues well that the proposal that Anaximenes of Lampsacus is the author of the letter from Philip (Ps.-Dem. xii) ‘must remain only

an hypothesis’ (19). He is also correct in accepting the decree described in Ps.-Dem. xii 6 as genuine and dated to 344/3 (49–54).

²⁸ Diod. xvi 75.1–2; Ps.-Dem. xi 5–6; Arr. *Anab.* ii 14.5.

secretly brought back funds for distribution among the politicians for the purpose of stirring up the war against Philip and that Demosthenes and Hypereides shared in this money up to the amount of three thousand darics, but accusations of corruption were common among political enemies and are not worth much credit. Such was the legacy of the pro-Philip and anti-Persian propaganda of Isocrates and the attempt of Androtion to secure the adoption by the Athenians of a policy, which, with the exception of its defensive posture, closely resembled that of his former teacher.

IV. THE LETTER OF SPEUSIPPUS TO PHILIP

The letter of Speusippus, when it is considered in its precise historical context, displays more open support of the Macedonian king than the *Philippus* of Isocrates. The *Philippus* was written during the negotiations over the Peace of Philocrates when the majority of Athenians were in favour of peace with Philip. Hence, if it were not for his subsequent writings, the author could be given the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, Speusippus wrote his letter to Philip probably in the winter of 343/2 (certainly after Artaxerxes' conquest of Egypt) when the Athenians recognised Philip as their most dangerous enemy.²⁹ In spite of initial disappointment over the results of the peace, the majority of Athenians still maintained their good will towards Philip in September 344, as has been shown above, and their friendship still prevailed when Demosthenes delivered the *Second Philippic* in about March 343.³⁰ This favourable feeling changed to intense hostility during the summer of 343, and the change can be detected in the condemnation of Philocrates, the narrow acquittal of Aeschines, the exile of Androtion, and in the insulting response made by the Athenians to the embassy of Python. Philip alienated the majority of Athenians by a number of aggressive actions and moves, most of which can be firmly dated to the summer of 343.³¹ He introduced soldiers into Porthmus, a port of Euboea facing the north coast of Attica, a position interpreted by the Athenians as a threat to the Eretrian democracy and as a potential base of operations against Attica.³² His oligarchic partisans in Elis amid a massacre overthrew the democracy there (Dem. xix 260, 294), and he sent mercenaries to aid oligarchs in Megara to capture the city and take over the government there (Dem. xix 295), an attempt which had failed by the time of Aeschines' trial because of Athenian aid to the Megarian democrats.³³ During the same summer Artaxerxes conquered Egypt and greatly strengthened his position.³⁴ Philip, probably to assure himself of a free hand in Europe, concluded a treaty of 'friendship

²⁹ The letter of Speusippus to Philip (*Ep. Socr.* xxx) contains only two indications of a date: the support of Philip's claim to Ambracia in § 7 and the reference to a shortage of papyrus in Athens due to the Persian reconquest of Egypt in § 14. Philip's campaign in Epirus and his march against Ambracia is firmly dated by all the sources to the winter/spring, 343/2 (Ps.-Dem. vii 32; Dem. xlvi 24 ff; that this activity took place in the middle or early in the second half of the archon year 343/2 is indicated by a combination of the schol. on Aesch. iii 83 and the inscription *IG* ii² 225). It would have been extremely tactless of Speusippus to defend Philip's claim to Ambracia after he had failed in an attempt to capture the city (Dem. ix 72), and therefore Antipater and Speusippus must have defended his claim shortly *in advance* of his march against the city, or in the autumn or winter, 343. The shortage of papyrus in Athens could then be explained by Artaxerxes' conquest of Egypt in the summer of 343, for which date, see below n. 34.

³⁰ Beloch's date for the *Second Philippic* (*Gr. Gesch.* iii² 2, 289-90) still stands, in spite of the latest

treatment of the question by Cawkwell, *op. cit.* (above n. 26) esp. 123-5. I plan to consider the views of Cawkwell on the chronology of 344/3 in a forthcoming article.

³¹ None of these events is mentioned by Demosthenes in the *Second Philippic*; they are all described as of recent occurrence or as current in his speech *De Falsa Legatione*, which is dated to late summer, 343 (Schaefer, *Demosth.* ii² 383, n. 1).

³² Dem. xix 87, 204, 219, 326, 334; ix 33.

³³ G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* n.s. xiii (1963) 200-13, on 200-3, goes too far in dismissing the claims of Demosthenes of Philip's intervention in Peloponnesian affairs, in Megara, and in Euboea as early as the summer of 343. I will, however, respond to his arguments in a forthcoming article on Demosthenes' *Second Philippic*.

³⁴ Cawkwell, *op. cit.* (above n. 26) 122-3, dates Artaxerxes' reconquest of Egypt to the archon year 343/2 on the basis of the so-called dream of Nektanebo, but I would agree with Jacoby, *FGrH* IIIb (suppl.) ii, p. 430, that this evidence is worthless. See above n. 30.

and alliance' with Artaxerxes.³⁵ The threat which this combination posed to Athenian interests in the Hellespont completely discredited the pro-Macedonians in Athens who had opposed aid to the Persians and had appealed to Philip's leadership in the event of Persian aggression against the Ionian Greeks. Androtion, who had led the assembly to adopt these decrees, was forced into exile at Megara (*FGrH* 324, T 14), and Philocrates, who perhaps had supported the policy, fled from Athenian territory to avoid the death penalty.³⁶

Probably shortly before the trial of Aeschines, Philip sent Python of Byzantium, a former pupil of Isocrates, to Athens in an attempt to improve his relations with the city.³⁷ Hegesippus took advantage of the current disgrace of Isocrates and his followers and smeared Python by association with them. He said that Python had been briefed in what to say in his official speeches as ambassador by his former schoolmasters in Athens (*Ps.-Dem.* vii 23). Python in a spirit of reconciliation urged the orators not to attack the peace, because it was not good policy to rescind it, but to amend any unsatisfactory clause on the understanding that Philip would give careful consideration to all measures which the Athenians decreed.³⁸ Immediately after the speeches for and against Python, Hegesippus proposed a decree which was in direct contravention to a basic provision of the peace of Philocrates (*Ps.-Dem.* vii 19, 24). The peace treaty provided that each of the two parties to the peace should have what territory they held at the time of the peace.³⁹ Hegesippus proposed that each should have 'their own' possessions, and his proposal was adopted by the assembly.⁴⁰ Such an amendment reopened the question whether Philip had a right to possess any territories formerly claimed by the Athenians, including Amphipolis, Potidaea, Pydna, Methone and many other cities. In response to the embassy of Python, Hegesippus himself was sent as an envoy to Philip, and he and his colleagues were very badly received (*Dem.* xix 331). The Athenians could have been under no illusion that Philip would accept such an amendment. Surely their motive was to make an insulting response to Philip's conciliatory gesture.

The rude Athenian reception of Python's embassy signalled the failure of Isocratean efforts to promote the interests of Philip and offered the Academy the opportunity to divert royal patronage towards themselves. In the late 360s, Plato had sent Euphraeus of Oreus to the court of Perdiccas, Philip's elder brother, and the Academician had exerted a considerable influence there.⁴¹ For sixteen years, however, the Academy had been without any connexions in Macedon, and, in the meantime, their major source of patronage in the tyrants of Syracuse had utterly dried up. Philip had now become the most powerful ruler in Europe, and the eyes of intellectuals were turned hopefully towards him. The head of a philosophic school in 343 would have seen the appointment of one of his pupils as tutor to Alexander as the most promising means of gaining a lasting influence in the Macedonian court. Speusippus, nephew of Plato, who upon the latter's death had become head of the Academy, wrote his letter to Philip at the exact time that the Macedonian king was considering the choice of a tutor for his son,⁴² and Isocrates himself attests his wish that Alexan-

³⁵ The treaty mentioned in Arrian is undated, but this is the only plausible time for it; it must come before Persian hostility towards Macedon in summer, 340 (*FGrH* 328, F 162; *Diod.* xvi 75. 1-2; *Ps.-Dem.* xi 5-6; *Arr.* ii 14.5), and previous to Artaxerxes' conquest of Phoenicia he was too weak for an alliance to serve any need of Philip.

³⁶ *Hyper.* iv 29-30; *Dem.* xix 116-18; *cf.* 112-13, 114, 119, 145, 206-8; *Arist. Rhet.* 138ob 8; *Aesch.* ii 6; iii 79, 81.

³⁷ Python of Byzantium, pupil of Isocrates: *Zosimus, Vit. Isocr.* p. 256, 91; *schol.* on *Aesch.* ii 125; *Olympiod. Comm. in Plat. Gorg.* i p. 447c. Demosthenes' statement in his speech *De Falsa Legatione* (xix 181): '... then here you pass decrees of a different sort,—that... you will amend the peace' (beware of C. A. Vince's translation in the Loeb edition) indicates that Python's embassy had come to Athens before late summer 343. Since there is no hint in

the *Second Philippic*, which was delivered in spring 343 (above n. 30), of any offers from Philip that the Athenians might propose amendments to the peace, the embassy of Python ought to be dated to the early summer of 343.

³⁸ *Ps.-Dem.* vii 21-2; *cf.* *Dem.* xviii 136.

³⁹ *Ps.-Dem.* vii 26-7; *schol.* on *Dem.* xix 161, p. 391, 27; *Dem.* v 25.

⁴⁰ *Ps.-Dem.* vii 18, with *schol.* p. 81, 4.

⁴¹ Plato, *Ep.* v; *Carystius, fr. 1 ap. Athen.* 506e, *fr. 2 ap. Athen.* 508d = Müller, *FHG* iv p. 357.

⁴² There is no doubt that Aristotle became tutor in 343/2 during the archonship of Pythodotus (*Dionys. Halic., Ep. ad Ammae.* i 5, p. 728; *Apollodorus, Chron., ap. Diog. Laert.* v 10). See I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957) 249-58, who argues convincingly that the source for this date is Philochorus. For the date of Speusippus' letter, see above n. 29.

der be instructed in the subjects and methods of his own school and not in the *eristics* of the Academy (*Ep.* v).⁴³ The position, however, was not one, similar to a university chair, for which intellectuals could openly apply. The most that a *scholarch* could do was to exert himself to win sufficiently high regard from Philip that the latter would be drawn towards appointing a member of his school. For this reason Speusippus sent his letter to Philip.

The head of the Academy obviously regarded Isocrates as his chief rival. He repeatedly draws attention to weaknesses and omissions in the *Philippus* (*Ep. Socr.* xxx 1-5, 8-11, 13-14), complains of Isocrates' criticism of Plato (2) and even attacks the aged Athenian rhetorician personally (4, 11, 13). He also makes unfavourable remarks about Theopompus of Chios, a former pupil of Isocrates (*FGrH* 115, T 1, 5, 20, 24), who was in residence at Philip's court and, according to Speusippus, speaking ill of Plato (*Ep. Socr.* xxx 12). Speusippus recommends strongly his own pupil Antipater of Magnesia (1, 5-9, 12) and even urges that Philip 'order Antipater to read aloud his Greek History in Theopompus' presence' so that the Chian historian 'will realise that he remains rightfully neglected by all men and wrongfully receives your (Philip's) patronage' (12). The head of the Academy knew, however, that he could not win Philip's favour by merely running down the opposition but that he must make a positive contribution.

Speusippus wished that Philip would regard Antipater's accounts of Heracles as a 'minority report' by the Academy to the embassy of Python which would be useful towards proving the legitimacy of his claim to the territories which he was holding. The writer stresses that Antipater's accounts were 'worthy of credit' (important only if they were to be offered as proof of something) and were 'arguments with the strength to help your (Philip's) rule' (5, 8). When the assembly responded to Python and the other ambassadors from Philip by disputing his right to hold territories once claimed by the Athenians, the head of the Academy and his pupil Antipater of Magnesia replied with 'proof' that Philip had claims to these areas prior to any that the Athenians could put forward. Hence, first, Antipater recounted myths which demonstrated that Philip's claims to Amphipolis predated Athens'. Aeschines at his trial soon after the embassy of Python and shortly before Speusippus wrote his letter defended himself by repeating an argument which he had originally delivered in his speech to Philip on the First Embassy in 346 that Athens had possessed the territory of Amphipolis in very ancient times (ii 31-3). He appealed to the tradition that Acamas, one of the sons of Theseus, received the district and the place once called Ennea Hodoi (Amphipolis) as the dowry of his wife. Antipater of Magnesia intended to refute precisely this argument when he told (*Ep. Socr.* xxx 6) that Heracles had slain Syleus, a man of violent character, in the region of Amphipolis and had given the territory Phyllis (Amphipolis) to Dicaeus, the brother of Syleus, to be held in trust for the Heracleidae and that the Athenians and Chalcidians had wrongly taken possession of it. Antipater counters the basis of the Athenian claim put forward by Aeschines by establishing the basis of Philip's claim a generation earlier.

Second, Antipater argues that Alexander I's conquest of the Edonian area predated the Athenian attempt in 465. According to Speusippus, he had said (7): 'Moreover, all Macedonians know the recent acquisitions of Alexander (I) in the land of the Edonians.' This conquest, if it occurred, would actually precede the earliest Athenian attempt to settle the area in 465/4, an effort frustrated by the Edonians, and would much antedate the successful campaign of Hagnon in 437 (*Thuc.* i 100; iv 102). Antipater's argument was taken up and elaborated in the letter which Philip is said to have sent to the Athenians two and a half years later (*Ps.-Dem.* xii 21): 'For if it (Amphipolis) belongs to the original conquerors, have we not a right to hold it? It was my ancestor, Alexander, who first occupied the site, and, as the first-fruits of the Persian captives there, set up a golden statue at Delphi. Or if anyone disputes this and claims it for its later owners, here again the right is mine, because I besieged and captured the city, after its inhabitants had expelled you and accepted the Lacedaemonians as their founders . . .'. Philip had good reason to anticipate a dispute

⁴³ For a discussion of *Isocr. Ep.* v, see P. Merlan, *Historia* iii (1954) 60-81.

about the argument based on the deeds of Alexander I, because there is no evidence that the Persians in their retreat were attacked by the Macedonians but rather by the Thracians (Hdt. ix 89). This account, which, Antipater claimed, all Macedonians knew, was probably a tradition which had its origins in Macedonian efforts to conceal at least partly the discreditable role which Alexander I played during the Persian invasions of Greece.⁴⁴

How can the open advocacy of Philip's claims to Amphipolis by Speusippus, Antipater and their followers be explained when other pro-Macedonians exercised such restraint on this subject? Relations between Philip and the Athenians from the Peace of Philocrates till the summer of 343 had been quite good. Although the Athenians had given up Amphipolis under the terms of the peace by their assent to the general clause that each party should hold what territory it held at the time of the peace, it is indicative of their feelings that the cities to which they yielded claims do not seem to have been named in the treaty (Ps.-Dem. vii 26-7; cf. Dem. v 25). Philip's friends in Athens must have exercised great tact and discretion in order to avoid upsetting the delicate balance of good feeling created by the peace. Isocrates was guided by such a motive when he included in the *Philippus* the argument that it would be in Philip's interests to surrender Amphipolis to the Athenians and to the disadvantage of Athens to receive it (see above, pp. 81-2). Such an argument could have no effect on Philip's claims by its publication after those claims had been recognised by the Athenians in their acceptance of the peace. It must have been intended as a balm to wounded feelings and as a bid for Athenian good will towards the author of the panhellenic appeal. After the Athenians' insulting response to the embassy of Python, however, the friends of Philip in Athens had nothing to gain from discretion in the matter of Amphipolis, and it is in these changed circumstances that the open advocacy of his claims by the head of the Academy and his followers must be understood.

Third, the Academy responded to the embassy of Python by buttressing Philip's claims to other areas formerly held by the Athenians. Though the orators devoted most of their discussion to Amphipolis, the scope of Hegesippus' amendment that each of the two parties to the peace should have their own possessions included other territories of which Philip had deprived the Athenians, and Antipater, according to Speusippus, did not fail to consider some of these cities. Potidaea and Torone had been won for the Athenians by Timotheus in 364,⁴⁵ and Potidaea had been occupied by Athenian cleruchs before 361 (Tod 146). In the summer of 356 when Philip captured Potidaea, he sent home the Athenians, sold into slavery the other inhabitants and assigned the territory to the Cynthians. Certainly both Potidaea and Torone became part of the dominion of Philip after his defeat of Olynthus in 348. Most relevant, however, to the thesis of this paper is the fact that Athenian claims to these areas were being discussed in 343 (Dem. vi 17, 20), and complaints were apparently being made by Athenians who had been deprived of their property and driven out by Philip at Potidaea (Ps.-Dem. vii 9-10; Dem. vi 20). Antipater doubtless had these alleged injustices and Athenian claims to Potidaea and Torone in mind when he modified local traditions in such a way as to prove that Philip had a justification for rule in these lands prior to any Chalcidian or Athenian claim (*Ep. Socr.* xxx 6). The Academician wrote that Heracles had slain Alcioneus, an evil and lawless man, in Pallene and had assigned 'Potidaea and the rest of Pallene to Sithon, son of Poseidon, to be held in trust'. In reference to Torone, he wrote (7) that Heracles slew the tyrants Tmolus and Telegonus, sons of Proteus, and granted their land to a certain Aristomachus, son of Sithon, to guard. Such myths could be, and perhaps were, used by Philip as propaganda against any Athenian claims to these areas and in response to the accusations made against him by dispossessed Athenian cleruchs.

Speusippus also offered support for Philip's claims to privileges and territory which had not been discussed during the negotiations with Python's embassy. As an additional bid for favour, he recommended Antipater's mythological backing to Philip's control of the Amphictyony and to his aims at Ambracia. The misfortunes of the Phocians were of great

⁴⁴ See Hdt. v 17-22, with How & Wells, *Commentary*; vii 173, viii 140, ix 44-5.

⁴⁵ Dein. i 14; Diod. xv 81. 6; Isocr. xv 108;

Polyaen. iii 10. 15; date, schol. on Aesch. ii 31; Diod. *loc. cit.*

concern to the Athenians when Speusippus wrote his letter to Philip. In the spring of 343 Demosthenes as 'pylagoras' had travelled to Delphi, and, prosecuting Aeschines, he described the scene (xix 65): '... homesteads levelled with the ground, cities stripped of their defensive walls, a countryside all emptied of its young men; only women, a few little children, and old men stricken with misery'. In autumn 343 the first payment of thirty talents of the enormous annual reparations of sixty talents was due to be paid by the Phocians to Delphi (*SIG*³ 230; Diod. xvi 60). In defiance of an Amphictyonic decree carried by Philip and his friends in the Council, large numbers of Phocian exiles were at this time enjoying sanctuary in Athens.⁴⁶ In these circumstances Antipater came to the support of Philip by drawing on local myths to devise a precedent for the expulsion of the Phocians and the admission of the Macedonian king to the Amphictyonic Council. Speusippus writes (8): 'Since you are clearly interested in Amphictyonic affairs, I wish to tell you the story reported by Antipater about how the Amphictyons were first formed and how, being Amphictyons, the Phlegyans were destroyed by Apollo, the Dryopians by Heracles and the Crisaeans by the Amphictyons. For all these, who previously had been Amphictyons, were deprived of their votes, and others, receiving their votes, shared in the Amphictyonic community. Some of these peoples, Antipater says, you have imitated and as a victory prize at the Pythian games for your expedition to Delphi you received from the Amphictyons the two votes which previously belonged to the Phocians.' All this is fabrication. It amounted to merely one more slap in the face to the Phocians in their misery, but such propaganda was much opposed by the majority of Athenians who viewed with disfavour and alarm the admission of an individual king into a congress which from the most ancient times had been composed of twelve states.

When Speusippus was writing his letter, he could easily foresee that Philip in 342 intended to march into Epirus to dethrone Arybbas and replace him with Alexander, Olympias' brother. The philosopher could find no better way to cultivate the favour of Philip in this affair than to suggest that the latter should at the same time seize Ambracia. Hence, he recommended the myth of Antipater (7) 'that Heracles . . . killed Cleides and his sons in Ambracia . . . and gave the land of Ambracia to Ladaces and Charattes with the request that they give this deposit back to his descendants.' Such a proposal advocated by one claiming to be the spokesman for an important school of Athenian intellectuals would tend to alienate the Corinthians from friendship and alliance with Athens. Ambracia was a colony of Corinth and one of her most loyal allies. She had fought on the side of her metropolis against Athens in the Peloponnesian War because of her kinship and devotion to the Corinthians rather than loyalty towards Sparta.⁴⁷ She had supported the Corinthians against the Lacedaemonians in the Corinthian War (Diod. xiv 82.2 ff.) and against the Athenians again in the period of expansion of the Second Athenian Naval League.⁴⁸ The friendly relations of the two cities in the late 340s are proved by Demosthenes' statement in the *Third Philippic* only a year after Philip's attack (ix 34): 'Are not the Corinthians hit by his invasion of Ambracia and Leucas?' Demosthenes' policy was to promote friendship between Athens and the Peloponnesian states, and a bond already existed between Athens and Corinth because both cities had been allied to Phocis during the recent Sacred War.⁴⁹ Philip's settlement of that war no doubt drew them closer together. Corinth was involved at this time in the affairs of Timoleon in Sicily and had sent ships there,⁵⁰ but the threat to her colony Ambracia made her aware of the danger of Philip. The Athenians by the conclusion of important alliances in the Peloponnese and by sending troops to Acarnania succeeded in preventing Philip from attacking Ambracia.⁵¹ By this diplomacy and action the Athenians brought the Corinthians into alliance (Dem. xviii 237), and they are found fighting on the side of the Hellenes against Philip at Chaeronea (Strabo ix 414).

That the letter of Speusippus succeeded in winning Philip's favour is indicated by the appointment of Aristotle, a former member of the Academy, as tutor to Alexander. Aris-

⁴⁶ Dem. v 19; xix 80, 310, 327; xviii 36; Diod. xvi 60.

⁴⁷ Thuc. i 25-7, 46, 48; ii 80; vii 58.

⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* v 4. 65-6; vi 2. 3.

⁴⁹ Aesch. iii 118; Diod. xvi 60.

⁵⁰ Plut. *Timol.* 7 f.; Diod. xvi 65 f.

⁵¹ Dem. ix 72; schol. on Aesch. iii 83; *IG* ii² 225; Dem. xlviii 24-6.

tote was not at this time, when he was lecturing in Assos and Mytilene, the famous philosopher that he was later to become, and his views must have been still very much those of the Academy. Though Aristotle had left Athens in 347, he and Speusippus had remained friends. Their friendship in 341 is shown by the fact that Speusippus paid the debts owed by Hermias (Athen. vii 279c-f), after he had fallen into the hands of the Persians; this fallen tyrant of Atarneus was Aristotle's father-in-law and a supporter of Philip. Thus, a strong link is established between Speusippus, Aristotle, and Philip in the late 340s.⁵² That Isocrates felt some bitterness over the success of his rivals is shown by the letter which he sent to Alexander after Aristotle's appointment (*Ep.* v). He seems to believe that his detractors have the ears of the young prince when he writes: '... I should ... write you something calculated to convince any reader that I am now not out of my mind through old age and that I do not babble like a fool ...' (1). Isocrates next proceeds by innuendo to attack the sort of instruction which Alexander would be receiving from Aristotle and to recommend his own course of instruction. He claims that his informants say that Alexander is much too 'sensible' to attach too much importance to the study of *eristic* but prefers the practical 'training' which rhetoric gives' (3-4).

V. THE SERIOUS PURPOSE OF MYTHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Rationalist opinion tends to discount the importance of myths used for political arguments in antiquity, and says that they were not taken seriously by anyone. But such a view does not explain why everyone, not only intellectuals secluded in the schools but active politicians in public debate, employed such techniques. It was not just Isocrates, and then Antipater, looking it all up in Pherecydes and Hesiod, and beating Isocrates for the sake of an academic/Academic joke. The work of these scholars could serve just as practical ends as that of the orators in assembly or on embassy. Aeschines (see above, p. 94) in Philip's presence supported Athenian claims to Amphipolis by telling the myth of Acamas, son of Theseus. Such practice was common. The Athenian ambassador Callias, son of Hipponicus, in his speech to the Spartans in 371 argued that the Athenians and Spartans should never have fought each other, since Heracles, founder of the Spartan state, and the Dioscuri had been initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries by Triptolemus, ancestor of the speaker (*Xen. Hell.* vi 3.6). Again, Callistratus in his embassy to the Arcadians, probably in 362, tried to persuade them not to conclude an alliance with the Thebans and Argives, and among his arguments was the reminder that Thebes had produced the patricide Oedipus and Argos the matricide Orestes. Epaminondas is said to have replied that these men were innocent at birth, and, when their crimes became known, were expelled by their own cities and found refuge in Athens.⁵³ Callistratus, of course, was one of the greatest Athenian political leaders in the 370s and 360s, a realist whom nobody could call soft-minded, and he probably used such arguments frequently in his speeches, though they were risky when employed against an Epaminondas. Citation of myth to establish a claim to trusteeship over a territory is closer to what Antipater was doing in the letter of Speusippus. This also was done by practising statesmen. In 343, Hypereides demonstrated that 'the temple in Delos belonged to the Athenians from ancient times by making extensive use of myth', and the Amphictyons decided in favour of the Athenians rather than the plaintiff Delos.⁵⁴ Arguments based on myths, therefore, performed a rather important function, that of clarifying claims to legitimacy and to the legitimate possession of territory by non-violent means, in a period in which

⁵² For an excellent account of Hermias' association with the Academy, see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, transl. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1948) 111-21. Also useful is D. Wormell, *Yale Classical Studies* v (1935) 57-92. P. Merlan, *Philologus* ciii (1959) 206-10, argues convincingly against Jaeger that there was no break between Aristotle and Speusippus when the former left the Academy in 347.

⁵³ Nepos, *Epam.* 6; Plut. *Mor.* 193c, 810 f; cf. Theopompus Comicus, *fr.* 30 Kock i 740, *ap.* Athen. xi 485c.

⁵⁴ Maxim. Planud. *Rhet. Graec.* v 481 Walz; Hyper. *Deliakos*, *fr.* 1. 1 in *Minor Att. Or.* (LCL) ii 564; *Contr. Demad.* *fr.* 19. 1 in *ibid.* 577-8; Dem. xviii 134-6; xix 209; *IG* ii² 222 and 1636-1652.

hegemonies could no longer be firmly established and military and political vacuums were the rule rather than the exception, and via a language which was familiar to all Greeks and to which there was indeed no alternative in inter-state or hegemonic political theory.

VI. THE MOTIVES OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN SUPPORTING PHILIP

Aristotle writes on the origins of monarchy (*Pol.* 1310b 9–12): ‘Kingships have grown for the purpose of helping the better classes against the populace; it is from these classes that kings have been drawn; and the basis of their position has been their own pre-eminence, or the pre-eminence of their family, in character and conduct’ (see also 1310b 40–1311a 2). Philip’s position as king of Macedon would have inclined him to be a defender of the interests of the propertied classes. Other reasons also made the oligarchs his natural allies, if his aims were to extend his control over the Greek cities. By the fourth century most of the Greek city-states had democratic constitutions, and these democracies tended to be more stable and less subject to civil strife than oligarchies.⁵⁵ These circumstances meant that Philip’s best opportunities for intervention in the affairs of the Greek cities lay in support of the oligarchs who were discontented with life under the democracies. As Momigliano pointed out, the only group which stood to gain from the domination of Philip in Greece were the oligarchs.⁵⁶ A ruler or ruling class of a powerful state would find it more difficult to control the foreign policy of a democracy than of an oligarchy. For example, if Philip by his conduct should alienate the support of the majority of Athenians, the city would suddenly turn to opposition towards his aims. By attending to the selfish interests of ‘the few’ in the various cities he could ensure a more consistent support for his aims of foreign conquest. After the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates, by which Philip had got control of the pass of Thermopylae and thus access into southern Greece, he supported oligarchs in both Megara and Elis in attempts to overthrow by force the democracies in those cities, and was successful in Elis (see above p. 92). Moreover, the Athenian democracy eventually proved so ‘undependable’ that in 322 it was put down by the Macedonians under Antipater.

Philip’s support of the propertied classes would certainly have appealed to both Isocrates and Speusippus (on the assumption that the latter shared his uncle’s opposition towards democracy). Both the teacher of rhetoric and Plato proposed in place of the existing democracy utopian societies which in their opinion would be more just. On close inspection one finds that the aims of these systems was simply to replace the freedom and equality of the society in which they lived with a hierarchical and authoritarian state. Isocrates advocated an oligarchic constitution for Athens: public offices were to be held only by men of property, and pay for magistracies was to be abolished (vii 24–7; xii 145–7). He claims to write in favour of the democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes (vii 16–8), but he described his own idealisation of the past which was as utopian as any scheme proposed by Plato. The rich were generous towards the poor and the latter supported the prosperity of the rich (vii 31–5); the poems of Solon show otherwise.⁵⁷ Pericles boasted with justifiable pride (Thuc. ii 37) of the freedom of the Athenians both in their political life and in their relations with each other, while Isocrates (vii 37, 39, 46–9) urged moral supervision of adults by the Council of the Areopagus and scrutiny of the private life of each citizen by the villages of the city and demes of the country. He was, above all, concerned with the security of private property⁵⁸ since he was a man of great wealth.⁵⁹ Worst of all is his selfishness which he conceals behind a tiresome moral posturing that ‘the best’ should rule (vii 21–2). Aristotle recognised that in practice rule of ‘the good’ meant rule of the rich (*Pol.* 1301b 39–1302a 2).

The correspondence of the Athenian intellectuals with Philip and the activity of the politicians who shared their aims impeded Demosthenes’ efforts to prepare the Greek cities for resistance to the Macedonian king. Persian money would have been useful for hiring

⁵⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 1286b 20–3, 1296b 25–31, 1302a 9, 1307a 13–20.

⁵⁶ A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence, 1934) 131.

⁵⁷ See e.g. Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Gr.*³ fasc. 1, Solon, *fr.* 1, esp. 11. 71–3; *fr.* 5; 14; 24.

⁵⁸ vii 31–5, 52–3; viii 128; xv 159–60.

⁵⁹ xv 5, 30–1, 39–41, 146–7, 154–8; xii 7–8.

mercenaries and financing naval expeditions to bring aid wherever it was needed. It is, of course, impossible to say whether such funds would have been sufficient to tip the scales in favour of the Greeks at Chaeronea. Though the results of the struggle could not have been known in the late 340s, Philip's aims and the effect which their achievement would have on the power of Athens and other Greek states had become clear to the intelligent, and it was an obligation of every citizen to act in the best interests of his city. The antipathy of the intellectuals towards democracy, which originated in the fifth century in reaction against doctrines of equality, outweighed their loyalty to their city. They were not unwilling that Athens ultimately fall under the control of Philip because they felt that either their philosophic dreams or their gross material interests would best be realised under such conditions.

Charlottesville, Virginia

MINOR M. MARKLE, III